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Abstract: The Zenrin gakusei kaikan incident (善隣学生会館事件) in 1967 was a major street
fight between left-wing student rioters from the Japanese Communist Party and the ethnic
Chinese community in Tokyo. The open fighting lasted three days and at its peak involved
upwards to seven hundred people from both sides. In the grand scheme of the global “long
1968,” this one particular brawl perhaps did not amount to much, and is generally forgotten in
today’s scholarship. However, it is unique as a point of intersection between three separate
historical processes: Japan’s student movement, China’s Cultural Revolution, and the diplomatic
normalization between the two countries. By situating this incident as the centre of the story
instead of the periphery of these larger movements, this paper is an exercise in transnationalism,
hoping to illustrate the impressive degree of exchange of people and ideas between China and
Japan, even in the most seemingly improbable times.
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Underneath the chill, sunny sky of a March afternoon sat the drab five-story building of
the “Good Neighbour Student Hall.” The fluttering slogan banners and red drapes hanging out
from the upper-story windows could not conceal the fact that this was a structure woefully
behind the times. Technically it had five stories, but the fifth was really just the top of a corner
tower jutting above the main building, which only had four floors. The overall construction could
be aptly described as a giant chunk of reinforced concrete, with a comically small traditional East
Asian roofing slapped on top almost as an afterthought. Clearly, the original architect was trying
to copy the Imperial Crown Style of eclectic architecture popular before the war. Perhaps, when
it was first completed, the building had once commanded some degree of respect, but now, in the
spring of 1967, it could do nothing more than silently bearing witness to the impassioned folly of
youth.
“Long Live the Great Helmsman Chairman Mao!”
“Be resolute, fear no sacrifice, and surmount every difficulty to win victory!”
From within the barricaded building came rhythmic chanting of Quotations from
Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The walls of the entryway were plastered with portraits of the
Chairman and big-character posters condemning the evils of imperialism, revisionism, and
reaction. Outside, the student hall was surrounded by hundreds of rioters armed with two-byfours and metal bars, who shouted back slogans such as “Great power-ism get out!” A line of
police officers stood by in the distance, almost helplessly, and did nothing as a group of helmeted
youth suddenly sprang forward from the besieging crowd and rushed the building’s front
entrance. At the same time, another group had been climbing into the building through first-floor
windows in the back. The commotion from this coordinated assault quickly drowned out the
chanting. The tables and other furniture acting as makeshift barricades in the entryway were
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smashed and overturned, but the attackers were immediately met with frantic blasts from water
hoses and fire extinguishers. The battle soon descended into close-quarters mêlée within the tight
hallways of the building’s ground floor. Nothing more could be seen from outside as the crowd
swarmed the entrance. From within the concrete building came the cacophony of shouting,
cussing, metal and wood clashing, and painful screaming.
Such scenes were by no means uncommon in 1967. Just a little less than a year earlier,
the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution had begun in China and quickly descended into chaos
as ideological students flowed onto the streets of Beijing, eager to defeat the elusive “enemies of
the revolution.” By March 1967, the entire country had fallen into anarchy as radical Red Guards
overthrew local governments and communist party organizations; the resulting power vacuum
often led to brutal fighting between rival Red Guard factions. Compared to later years, this early
period of the Cultural Revolution (from 1966 to 1968) featured the most intense outburst of
collective violence and caused profound direct damage to all aspects of Chinese society and
politics. 1
However, the opening scenes at the drab little building did not happen in communist
China, but on the streets of Tokyo, Japan, the heart of capitalism and Cold War liberalism in
Asia.

The Cultural Revolution in China, the 1960s’ student movement in Japan, and the
diplomatic normalization between Beijing and Tokyo — these are all well-studied subjects by
themselves, but what are the relations between them? At a first glance, there seems to be none,
other than the mere chronological fact that they all took place somewhere between the mid-1960s
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and early-1970s. The great social upheavals in China and Japan, although both championed by
idealist young students, were driven by very different catalysts and carried very different
dynamics. The normalization of relations between the two countries, on the other hand, was
largely facilitated by pragmatic diplomats and businessmen, much removed from the ideological
turmoil on the streets. However, upon closer examination, the mutual impact and influence
between these seemingly disparate historical processes become obvious. At times, their powerful
interplays even collide into one another, reaching ferocious climaxes and resulting in unexpected
ramifications.
The events that took place at the drab little building in early 1967 is the perfect example
of such a transnational collision. For a brief while, the “Good Neighbour Student Hall Incident”
— in Japanese as Zenrin gakusei kaikan jiken and in Chinese as Shànlín xuéshēng huìguǎn
shìjiàn — occupied headlines in newspapers across Japan and China, and even came onto the
CIA’s radar. 2 At a time when the free movement of people did not exist between communist
China and capitalist Japan, this extraordinary street fight somehow saw the direct involvement of
Chinese Red Guards, Japanese communists, young students of both nationalities, and the two
countries’ governments. This unique incident was the combined result of all three historical
processes mentioned above, and would go on to play a nontrivial role in each one’s development.
However, its significance was eclipsed by the madness of the Cultural Revolution in China and a
series of much higher-profile civil unrests in Japan later that year. Then, just as suddenly as it
erupted, the conflict over a student dormitory soon faded into the background of a turbulent, socalled “long 1968.” As a story that straddles the national histories of both China and Japan, it
cannot be easily delineated through the perspective of just one, and is thus conveniently silenced
by both. Today, it is nothing more than a footnote in most Japanese histories of the 1960s’
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student movement, and essentially absent in Chinese books on Cultural Revolution-era
diplomacy. The fascinating story of the Zenrin Student Hall is only one of the many victims of
the nation-centred historiography dominant in East Asia. By rediscovering this forgotten tale,
this paper hopes to illustrate the impressive degree of transnational exchange that exists between
China and Japan, even in the most seemingly improbable times.

The effect of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese society and politics is without question
comprehensively devastating, but the Cultural Revolution was not merely a domestic affair. The
diplomatic service, while relatively sheltered from the Red Guards’ violent uprisings, was not at
all exempt from the revolutionary fervor that swept through the whole country. Under the policy
of “exporting revolution,” the Chinese government for much of the late-1960s actively sought to
foment Maoist subversion in foreign countries and openly “struggled” against foreign
governments it labelled as “reactionary.” While such extremist policies generally led to the
deterioration of China’s foreign relations and Chinese isolation from the international stage, in
Asia — especially Japan — it was not without momentary success. 3
From its very beginning, the student movement in Japan was heavily influenced by
Maoism and saw the adoption of many Chinese political concepts, practices, and even slogans,
so much so that it is sometimes inappropriately referred to as the “Japanese Cultural
Revolution.” 4 Today, Japanese historians generally agree that Japan as a nation was one of the
most heavily influenced by the Cultural Revolution. 5 At the time, even while the Japanese
Communist Party (JCP) officially denounced the Cultural Revolution launched by its Chinese
counterpart, many prominent leftists in Japan still expressed their loyalty to Beijing as the new
centre of world communism. Young students, many disillusioned with the social fallout of
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Japan’s rapid economic growth and urbanization, were in particular attracted to the radical antiestablishment alternative offered by China, even if they understood little of Chinese politics and
society. 6 Indeed, when university students stormed and occupied their campuses across Japan in
1968, it was not Miyamoto Kenji’s portrait that was hung atop the main gates, but that of Mao
Zedong. By rejecting the established communist party leadership and advocating for a return to
Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, these radical student activists would later collectively become
known as the “New Left.” 7
Of course, the “Old Left” in Japan also did not sit idly by as its followers jumped ship.
Despite the rise of New Left organizations that explicitly opposed it, the historic communist
party still held some considerable sway among the student population. Its youth wing, the
Democratic Youth League of Japan or Minsei for short, boasted more than two hundred thousand
members nationwide in 1966. 8 Although the JCP had nominally abandoned militant action as
party policy, it still maintained the right to “self-defence.” Throughout the late-1960s, Minsei
and its various New Left enemies in the Japanese student movement would engage in open
conflict, both through rhetoric and with wooden clubs. As the ideological battlelines were being
drawn, caught in between were the police, the socialists, the semi-official Chinese trade office in
Tokyo, and the ethnic Chinese community. A confrontation was simply waiting to break out. The
Cultural Revolution was coming to Japan.

In early 1967, as both the Cultural Revolution and the Japanese student movement were
gearing up to escalate into their most intense phases, in the heart of old Tokyo right outside
Koishikawa-Kōrakuen Garden, a simple four-story building would become the site of the first
explosion of violence. The Zenrin gakusei kaikan, “Good Neighbour Student Hall,” was a
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dormitory for Chinese overseas students in Tokyo, but its story would prove to be anything but
what the name suggests. First built in 1935 sponsored the then-Japanese puppet state of
Manchukuo, ownership of the student hall fell into question after the Second World War.
Eventually, a decision was reached to keep the upper floors for the Chinese students who still
remained in Japan, while the lower floors were refurbished as business space promoting SinoJapanese cultural exchange. One of the tenants was the Japan-China Friendship Association
(JCFA), whose national headquarters office was located in the west end of the first floor.
However, when the JCP officially denounced the Cultural Revolution and entered into
opposition against communist China, the once seemingly perfect arrangement in the building
suddenly became problematic.
Most if not all of the Chinese students were ardent supporters of communist China and its
Cultural Revolution, but the Friendship Association was run by the Japanese Communist Party.
The awkward neighbours finally turned into violent neighbours on 28 February 1967, when an
JCFA employee — allegedly — torn down one of the Chinese students’ big-character posters
(dàzìbào, a type of large-sized, handwritten political wallposters popular in China during the
Cultural Revolution) in the building’s entryway. Sometime after eleven o’clock, a dozen or so
Chinese students came to the front door of the JCFA office and demanded an apology. Before
anyone had figured out anything, a fistfight broke out. Either by pure circumstance or perhaps
premeditation (as both sides would later accuse the other of), the fisticuff soon escalated into
something much more serious. Both sides called in their reinforcements and simply refused to
back down. The JCFA office phoned the JCP who quickly mobilized Minsei student troops
armed with construction helmets and wood staves, while Japanese New Left allies came to the
Chinese students’ aid. 9
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By nightfall, barricades were set up, and the building was sieged, leading to the chaotic
scenes described at the paper’s opening. The incident lasted more than two days, with twenty or
so participants injured, but its repercussions was much more far-reaching, and the number of
parties involved almost disproportionate. At its peak, the number of Chinese students and their
Japanese New Left allies inside the building totalled one hundred fifty, while the JCP had almost
five hundred Minsei paramilitary members outside; two companies of riot police were called in;
senior leaders of the JCP were on scene, and so was the head of the Chinese LT Trade Office in
Tokyo. 10 For months after the incident, the two sides engaged in a fierce war of propaganda,
with the Chinese government bringing the full force of its state machine to support the Chinese
students. As the students and JCFA retreated to their respective floors, hostile confrontation
between the neighbours continued for three more years as a lengthy legal battle ensued. In 1970,
a settlement was finally reached between the JCFA and the student hall management whereby
the former agreed to move out of the building. 11 Even today, key details in this incident still
remain mysteries as the two sides maintained different narratives on what exactly happened.
Who threw the first punch? Was the fight purposefully instigated by any side? The world will
likely never know.
The fighting ended on the night of 2 March, but that was not the end of the story. In fact,
the Zenrin Student Hall Incident, as it had quickly become known, would only go on to serve as
the beginning of many stories. The incident marks the complete breakdown of relations between
the Chinese and Japanese Communist Parties, and by extension the collapse of all previous
efforts at rapprochement between the Chinese and Japanese governments. Within a solely
Japanese context, the Zenrin Student Hall Incident is also notable for its role in the country’s
student movement, seeing the student activists mature and radicalize in their violent tactics as
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they went into the year 1968. Many Chinese students involved in this struggle would later
become prominent figures in the Overseas Chinese Youth Struggle Committee, an ethnic
Chinese organization that would play its own crucial role in the history of Japan’s New Left
movement.

China’s Cultural Revolution, Japan’s student movement, and the peculiar diplomatic
relations between the two countries — without any of these three happening the way it did, there
would not have been a Zenrin Student Hall Incident. Just as the incident itself was the aggregated
result of all these disparate processes intersecting, unsurprisingly then, it would take on different
significance in each as they again diverged into their own paths. Such is the nature of history: on
a grand scale, no single event is ever the result of a single cause. Instead, historical phenomena
are usually the outcome of “multiple local, contingent, and conjunctural processes and happening
jointly [coming] together.” 12 The Zenrin Student Hall Incident is unique in that it is also
markedly transnational. It is not situated solely within either Japanese or Chinese history, but
bestrides both. On one side of the conflict is an internationalist party embroiled in the bitter
division of world communism, while on the other is a people essentially stuck between two
nations. Faced with such a story that defies traditional nation-state borders, one simply cannot
fully understand the nuanced motivations for each side without devoting time and effort to study
the various contextual processes behind them. This is no easy task, even if disregarding the
obvious language barrier. This paper, in its rambling twenty thousand words, has only managed
to outline the most basic course of events. Despite the micro-scale of the subject at hand, there
exists a great depth of materials and perspectives that this paper simply cannot entirely cover.
This remarkable incident simply involves so many distinct actors and groups across China and
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Japan, each deserving their own separate analysis. It is perhaps impossible for any one person to
have all the answers.
This is a particular dilemma of transnationalism, especially in the region of East Asia.
The Zenrin Student Hall Incident is a part of both China and Japan’s histories, but only on both
of their peripheries. In a field where historiography has traditionally been defined by nation-state
borders, those that exist on or near the border area, the periphery, are often left out of focus.
From a nation-centred perspective, it is often difficult for the historian to observe the periphery
clearly — one has to squint pretty hard to see what is going on over there. And good luck trying
to look beyond the border, for those are no longer “your” history. There be dragons. Sadly, such
phenomenon is especially common in East Asia, where the fabled “transnational turn” is still yet
to arrive in its full force. Starting from the mid-nineteenth century, when East Asia turned to
nationalism as the answer to Western imperialism, the study of history was transformed
accordingly in service of the new nation-state. 13 Almost two hundred years later, the nationalist
tradition still remains strong. Compared to other fields, East Asian history is woefully lacking in
terms of transnational studies. In fact, the very concept of an “East Asian history,” as opposed to,
say, Chinese history or Japanese history, is relatively new. 14 In China, Japan, and Korea, the
degree of interaction and dialogue between scholars of national histories is limited, while public
understanding and education is still very much based around nation-states. 15 Despite rising
interest in global history since the 1990s, nation-state-centred — and sometimes downright
nationalist — historical outlooks still remain dominant. 16 The result is that unique transnational
histories like that of the Zenrin Student Hall, instead of becoming subjects for both Chinese and
Japanese histories, get ignored by both.
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Ultimately, after more than fifty years, nobody really cares who threw the first punch
when. Just as the fight was never really about the torn down poster, the incident at Zenrin
Student Hall is worthy as a case study not for its significance in paramilitary history (although it
did play a role in it), but for its part in the greater history of transnational student radicalism
between China and Japan. At the intersection of histories, a tangle of storylines, events such as
the Zenrin Student Hall Incident are testaments that ideas and actions, even if taking place only
inside one building, are constantly receiving and generating reverberations across nation-state
borders, and indeed across different historical processes. The transnational lens has long been
used to examine the global student movement of the long 1968, but even though Maoism’s
influence on Japan is widely acknowledged, little work has been done to review the interactions
between the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Japanese student movement. One may not
think that there was much going on, in a time of severed relations and frozen contact, but
transnationalism is not merely defined by physical movement. Hopefully, this paper has
demonstrated that the late-1960s was in fact a period of intense cross-border influence between
China and Japan, featuring interactive social transformation in different arenas, and deserving of
its own place in the history of Sino-Japanese relations.
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